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De Bruyne: A European Perspective on the Liability of Credit Rating Agencies

A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE LIABILITY OF CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES
By Jan De Bruyne*
I. INTRODUCTION
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) such as Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's or Fitch
evaluate the creditworthiness of financial instruments or issuers of such instruments.I These
CRAs examine the risk that the payment of interests and capital will or will not completely
take place at the promised time.2 CRAs issue ratings in the form of a letter or alphabetic
symbol. The higher the given rating, the lower the credit risk for investors.3 By rating
financial instruments, CRAs help to reduce informational asymmetries between lenders and
investors on one side and borrowers or issuers on the other side. 4 Investors, who in most cases
do not have the capacity or time to examine and evaluate the quality of financial instruments
or the creditworthiness of the issuer of such instruments, use the ratings issued by CRAs to
make investment decisions.' In sum, the use of those symbols makes "ratings easily
comprehensible to even the dullest user and [enables] markets to respond quickly and, more
or less, uniformly to changes in ratings".6
Incorrect ratings of structured products contributed to the collapse of the subprimemortgage market in the US, which eventually led to the financial crisis in 2008.' Deceived
investors are increasingly trying to hold CRAs liable for the issuance of such flawed ratings.'

* Jan De Bruyne (Master in Law, Ghent University & Master EU Studies, Ghent University) is Academic
Assistant in the field of comparative and private law at the Ghent University Law School. He has been a
Visiting Fellow at the Institute of European and Comparative Law of Oxford University in 2014 and at the
Center for European Legal Studies of the University of Cambridge in 2015.
1 John C. Coffee Jr., Gatekeepers: the role of the professions in corporate governance 283-284 (15 ed. 2006).
2 Eddy Wymeersch & Marc Kruithof, Regulation and Liability of Credit Rating Agencies in Belgium, in The
Belgian Reports at the Congress of Utrecht of the International Academy of Comparative Law 351 (Eric Dirix
& Yves-Henri Leleu eds. 2006).
Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Orderingof Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 7
(2002); Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of CreditRating Agencies: An InstitutionalInvestor Perspective,
25 JIBLR 188, 189 (2010).
4 Harry McVea, Credit Rating Agencies, The Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Global Governance: The EU
Strikes Back, 59 Int'L & Comp. L.Q 701, 706-707 (2010); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial
Markets: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 619, 628--638 (1999); Jan De
Bruyne, How the threat of holding credit rating agencies liable might increase the accuracy of their ratings, 52
Willamette L. Rev. 173, 174 (2015).
5 Wymeersch & Kruithof, supra note 2, at 353; Alice Darbellay, Regulating Credit Rating Agencies 38 (1st ed.
2013)
6 Coffee, supra note 1, at 283-284.
See in this regard: Matt Krantz, 2008 crisis still hangs over credit-ratingfirms, USA Today, September 13,
2013,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/13/credit-rating-agencies-2008-financialcrisis-lehman/2759025/
8 See for example Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); Anschutz Corporation v. Merill Lynch & Co. Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Tolin v.
Standard& Poor's FinancialServices, 950 F.Supp.2d 714 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Federal Court Australia, Bathurst
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However, holding CRAs liable towards investors has not always been straightforward.
Besides problems with regard to the burden of proof, CRAs traditionally argue that their
ratings are mere opinions, the "world's shortest editorials" 9 ever written on a company's
creditworthiness. Rating agreements and codes of conduct stipulate ratings and are not
absolute assurances of credit quality or exact measures of the probability that an issuer or
financial product will default. Ratings are opinions on the credit quality and do not explicitly
recommend purchasing, holding or selling securities. Credit rating agencies gather complex
information from different sources and transform this into future predictions by using simple
symbols. o
As a consequence, CRAs consider themselves as members of the financial press and
their ratings as opinions falling under the freedom of speech protection. The protection of
ratings under the First Amendment to the US Constitution has already been extensively
examined elsewhere.1" Therefore, this article takes a European perspective on the freedom of
speech protection given to CRAs. After a brief discussion of the legal framework on CRAs in
the European Union (part II), the contribution focuses on the protection of ratings under
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) dealing with the freedom
of expression (part III).12 Even when assuming ratings would fall within the scope of Article
10 ECHR, national governments are allowed to restrict a CRA's freedom of speech under the
conditions set out in the second paragraph of the Article (part IV). I will then conclude with
summarizing the main findings of the article (part V).

Regional Council v Local Government FinancialServices Ply Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200 affirmed in Full
Federal Court Australia, ABNAMRO Bank NVv BathurstRegional Council [2014] FCAFC 65.
9 Gregory Husisian, What Standard of Care Should Govern the World's Shortest Editorials? An Analysis of
Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 Cornell L. REV. 411, 446 (1990).
10 Rachel Jones, The Needfor a Negligence Standard of Carefor Credit RatingAgencies, 1 Win. & Mary Bus.
L. Rev. 201, 210 (2010). See for an example: Part 7 ("What are Credit Ratings and Their Limits?") in S&P
Global
Ratings,
S&P
Global
Ratings
Code
of
Conduct,
March
1,
2018,
https://www.standardandpoors.com/ruRU/delegate/getPDF?articleld=2001716&type=COMMENTS&subTyp
e=REGULATORY.
" See e.g., Caleb H. Deats, Talk That Isn't Cheap: Does the FirstAmendment ProtectCredit Rating Agencies'
Faulty Methodologiesfrom Regulation?, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1818 (2010); Lisbeth Freeman, Who's Guarding
the Gate? Credit-RatingAgency Liability as "Control Person" in the Subprime Credit Crisis, 33 Vt. L. Rev.
585, 606-608 (2009); Jonathan W. Heggen, Not Always the World's Shortest Editorial: Why Credit RatingAgency Speech is Sometimes ProfessionalSpeech, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1745 (2011); Parisa Haghshenas, Obstacles
to Credit Rating Agencies' First Amendment Defense in Light of Abu Dhabi, 8 First Amend. L. Rev. 452
(2010); De Bruyne, supra note 4, at 202-206 with further references in the footnotes; Jan De Bruyne, Exploring
the limits of the freedom of speech for credit rating agencies after the financial crisis, in Human rights as a
basis for reevaluating and reconstructing the law 441 (Arnaud Hoc, Geoffrey Willems & Stdphanie Wattier eds.
2016).
" See generally, J. De Bruyne & C. Vanleenhove, Third-party liability for flawed class certificates: an
analysis of the viability of the credit rating agencies'freedomof speech defence for classficationsocieties, 22
JIML 304 (2016); J. De Bruyne & C. Vanleenhove, Class certicates and freedom of speech: classification
societies as the credit ratingagencies of the maritime sector? In Current issues in maritime and transport law
99 (Stefano Zunarelli & Massimiliano Musi eds. 2016). See generally, Article 10 of the ECHR: Alastair
Mowbray, Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights 671-731 (3 rd ed.
2012).
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II. THE EUROPEAN UNION LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES
At the international level, the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) took several initiatives to regulate CRAs. Examples include the Statement of
Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies1 3 and the Code of Conduct
Fundamentals for CRAs.14 However, none of these initiatives, deals with the liability of
CRAs. The Code of Conduct merely contains provisions that can be used by courts to
determine the (appropriate) level and standard of care for a reasonable and prudent CRA.
Several shortcomings also remain regarding the Code itself. It uses undefined terms (e.g.
sufficient or reasonable) 5 and "suffers from critical limitations".1 6 The Code is based on
voluntary compliance by CRAs and cannot be enforced by the IOSCO. " It does not contain
sanctions or a specific liability regime that regulators can use if CRAs violate one of the
fundamentals. Furthermore, national legislation in the jurisdictions where CRAs operate
prevails over the Code of Conduct Fundamentals. 9
The extent to which CRAs can be held liable is thus primarily determined by supraor national law. The European Union (EU) addressed the role and functioning of credit rating
agencies in different regulations. For instance, Regulation 1060/2009 introduced a regulatory
oversight regime on CRAs (Articles 14-20) and contained provisions to avoid conflict of
interest with the issuer (Articles 6-7). Credit rating agencies also have to use rigorous,
systematic, continuous rating methodologies that are subject to validation based on historical
experience.20 The EU adopted additional legislation that explicitly and clearly defined when
methodologies are rigorous,21 systematic,22 continuous23 and based on historical experience.24
The Principles were designed to improve the operation of CRAs. The Principles contain high-level
objectives and guidelines that address the quality and integrity of the rating process, improve the independence
of CRAs, prevent potential conflicts of interests and enhance the transparency and timelines of ratings
disclosure (Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commission, JOSCO
Statement of PrinciplesRegardingthe Activities of Credit Rating Agencies, September 25, 2003,
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD151.pdf).
" Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commission, Code of Conduct
FundamentalforCreditRating Agencies, August 2008,
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD271.pdf.
1s McVea, supra note 4, at 718.
16 McVea, supra note 4, at 719; Kristina St Charles, Regulatory Imperialism: The Worldwide Export of
EuropeanRegulatory Principleson Credit RatingAgencies, 19 Minn. J. Int'l L. 399, 409-410 (2010).
" Jakob de Haan & Fabian Amtenbrink, Credit RatingAgencies, DNB Working Paper No. 278, January 2011,
17-18, papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1760951; Charles, supranote 16, at 409-410.
18 Mohammed B. Hemraj, Soft law regulationof the credit rating agencies, 35
Comp. Law 10, 15-16 (2014).
19 Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commission, supra note 14, at 2; Jan
De Bruyne & Cedric Vanleenhove, Rating the EU regulatoryframework on the liability of credit rating
agencies: triple a orjunk?, 2 ESLR 117, 118-120 (2015); De Bruyne, supranote 4, at 196-199.
20 Article 8.3 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 16 September
2009 on credit rating agencies, OJ L 302. See for more information: Iris H.Y. Chiu, Regulating Credit Rating
Agencies in the EU: In Search of a Coherent Regulatory Regime, 271 European Bus. L. Rev. 269, 285 (2014).
21 Article 4 Commission Delegated Regulation 447/2012 supplementing
Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating
agencies by laying down regulatory technical standards for the assessment of compliance of credit rating
methodologies, OJ L 140/14.
22 Article 5 Commission Delegated Regulation
447/2012.
2 Article 6 Commission Delegated Regulation 447/2012.
13
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There are also several provisions in EU legislation dealing with the registration of
CRAs. Credit rating agencies have to apply for registration before they can provide their
services in the EU. 2 5 They have to submit an application for registration to the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). CRAs are granted registration only when they
demonstrate their ability to meet the applicable regulatory requirements. The application for
registration needs to contain information on those elements in Annex II of Regulation
26
1060/2009 on CRAs. ESMA has to ensure the Regulation on credit rating agencies is
27
applied and can conduct all necessary investigations of CRAs to that end. After registration,
ESMA supervises the registered rating agencies through a combination of desk-based
21
It can withdraw the registration if the CRA
supervisory activities and investigation.
expressly renounces the registration or has provided no ratings for the preceding six months,
obtained the registration by making false statements or by any other irregular means, or no
29
longer meets the conditions under which it was registered. Moreover, if ESMA's Board of
Supervisors finds that a CRA has committed one of the infringements listed in Annex III of
Regulation 513/2011, it can take several actions. These, for instance, include a withdrawal of
the CRA's registration, a temporary prohibition for the CRA to issue ratings until the
infringement has been brought to an end, or the suspension of the rating's use for regulatory
30
purposes until the infringement has been brought to an end.
More importantly, Article 35a of Regulation 1060/2009 as introduced by Article
1(22) of Regulation 462/2013 contains provisions on the liability of CRAs towards both the
issuers and investors. This is remarkable because the EU often leaves the private law effects
out of financial market legislation. 3 1 A liability regime for CRAs is even more surprising
when taking into account that supranational regulators were not always able to effectively
regulate the liability of other certifiers such as classification societies (maritime law),

Article 7 Commission Delegated Regulation 447/2012.
Articles 14-19 Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies.
26 Article 15 Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies as replaced by Article 1(9) Regulation 513/2011
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 amending Regulation 1060/2009 on credit
rating agencies, OJ L 145.
27 Article 21 Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies as replaced by Article 1(9) Regulation 513/2011;
Article 23c Regulation 1060/2009 as replaced by Article 1(11) Regulation 513/2011 amending Regulation
1060/2009 on credit rating agencies.
28 Article 21 Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies as replaced by Article 1(9) Regulation 513/2011.
29 Article 20 Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies as replaced by Article 1(9) Regulation 513/2011.
30 Article 24 Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies as replaced by Article 1(11) Regulation 513/2011.
31 Wouter den Hollander, European tort law through the front door: civil liability for credit rating agencies,
Leiden Law Blog, July 8, 2013, leidenlawblog.nl/articles/european-tort-law-through-the-front-door-civilliability-of-credit-rating-a. See for the discussion of the effects of the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive (MiFID) on private law: Marc Kruithof, De privaatrechtelfke werking van de MiFID-2004

24

25

gedragsregels:een analyse van de mate waarin zy de wederzydse rechten en plichten van diensiverlener en

client kunnen aanvullen en beperken, in Financiele regulering in de kering 273-356 (Instituut Financieel Recht
ed. 2012); Olivier Eloot & Helena Tilley, Beleggersbescherming in MiFID II en MiFIR: een overzicht en
toetsing van enkele recente nationale beleggersbeschermende maatregelen, Bank- en Financieel Recht 179
(2014).
32 The European Union only addressed the liability of classification societies in their public role acting as
Recognized Organizations on behalf of flag States (Article 5 Directive 2009/15 on common rules and standards
for ship inspection and survey organisations and for the relevant activities of maritime administrations, OJ L
131).
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auditors (financial law)" and notified bodies (medical devices)34. CRAs are liable when they
intentionally or with gross negligence commit any of the infringements listed in Annex III.3s
CRAs cannot face liability under the Regulation for simple negligence or only because they
issued a 'wrong' rating. In addition, the Regulation does not impose liability for CRAs when
they commit the infringement by mistake or because they did not display reasonable care
when issuing the rating. Such a standard of fault is appropriate as rating activities involve a
degree of assessment of complex economic factors. Using different methodologies may lead
to contrasting rating results, none of which can be considered incorrect.3 6
Any exclusion of liability for a CRA's gross negligence or intention in rating
contracts is deprived of legal effect. CRAs are able to limit their liability in advance where
that limitation is reasonable and proportionate, and allowed by the applicable national law.3 7
Any limitation that does not comply with these requirements or any contractual exclusion of
the liability is deprived of legal effect.3 1 Whether a limitation is reasonable and proportionate
has to be interpreted in the light of national legislation. The English Credit Rating Agencies
(Civil Liability) Regulations of 2013, for example, contain elements to determine whether the
limitation of liability is reasonable and proportionate. 3 9 This depends on whether the claimant
is an investor or an issuer (regulation 12) and the extent to which the rating was solicited
(regulation 10) or unsolicited (regulation 11).40 However, the Regulation on CRAs does not
contain rules on the limitation or exclusion of the liability of CRAs for ordinary negligence.
Consequently, the opposability and validity of such clauses is governed by national law.
The infringement of the Regulation must also have (had) an impact on the rating. It
is the investor who has to present accurate and detailed evidence indicating the CRA has
committed an infringement of this Regulation and that this infringement had an impact on the
rating. This implies the rating issued by the CRA has to be different from the rating that
would have been issued if the CRA had not committed that infringement. 41 The competent
court has to assess whether the presented information is accurate and detailed, taking into

The European Union only adopted a Recommendation with regard to the limitation of an auditor's liability
(Commission Recommendation of 5 June 2008 concerning the limitation of the civil liability of statutory
auditors and audit firms, OJ J L 162).
1 Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical
devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009
and repealing Council Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC, OJ L 117.
35 Article 35a, 1. Regulation 1060/2009 as introduced by Article 1(22) of Regulation 462/2013.
36 Recital (33) Regulation 462/2013 amending Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies; De Bruyne,
supra note 4, at 196-199.
1 Article 35a, 3. Regulation 1060/2009 as introduced by Article 1(22) of Regulation 462/2013.
38 Article 35a, 3. Regulation 1060/2009 as introduced by Article 1(22) of Regulation 462/2013.
3
For instance, if the claimant is an issuer who has entered into a contract with a CRA to assign a rating, the
following factors indicate that a limitation of liability is reasonable and proportionate: (a) the limitation resulted
from contractual negotiations between the issuer and the CRA; (b) the price agreed between the issuer and the
CRA reflects the extent of the limitation of liability; (c) the CRA gave the issuer a reasonable opportunity to
submit additional factual information not previously available, or to clarify any factual inaccuracies regarding
the proposed rating, before the credit rating was issued, and took account of those submissions or comments
when finalising the credit rating; and (d) the limitation relates to losses which the credit rating agency could not
reasonably have foreseen when it assigned the credit rating.
40 The Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013, No. 1637. Also see: De Bruyne, supranote
4, at 197.
4 Article 35a, 1. & 2. Regulation 1060/2009 as introduced by Article 1(22) of Regulation 462/2013.
33
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account the investor or issuer may not have access to information, which is purely within the
sphere of the CRA.4 2 The Regulation also requires a link between the infringement and the
loss suffered by the investor in two ways. First, the investor has to establish that he
reasonably relied on the rating in accordance with Article 5a(1) of the Regulation43 or
otherwise with due care. 44 What is to be understood under the notion 'reasonable reliance' is
unclear and not defined in the Regulation. It could imply that a CRA will not incur liability if
the investors mentioned in the Regulation (e.g. investment firms, insurance undertakings,
reinsurance undertakings or institutions for occupational retirement provision) did not make
their own credit risk assessment but relied solely on ratings to assess the creditworthiness of
an entity or financial instrument. 5 Second, the investor must have reasonably relied on the
rating for a decision to invest into, hold onto, or divest from a financial instrument covered by
that credit rating.4 6
III. ARTICLE 10 ECHR AND THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FOR CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES
The European Convention on Human Rights is a treaty that was drafted in 1950.
Each of the articles in the Convention protects a basic human right.4 7 According to Article 10
ECHR, for instance, everyone has the right to freedom of expression. The European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) has interpreted the right to freedom of speech in Article 10 as "one of
the basic conditions for [the] progress of a democratic society and for the development of
every man". 4 8 This right includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information or ideas without interference by a public authority. Several categories of speech
exist, each of them receiving protection under Article 10 ECHR. Expressions can be labelled
as value judgments (part A), factual statements (part B) or commercial speech (part C). 49
A.

Protection for Credit Ratings Under Article 10 ECHR as Value Judgements

The ECtHR makes a distinction between facts on the one hand and value judgments
on the other hand. This distinction is of importance when it comes to the application of the
restrictions contained in the second paragraph of Article 10 ECHR. Whereas the existence of
facts can be demonstrated, the truth and accuracy of value judgments is not susceptible of
proof.50 The requirement of proof for value judgments "is impossible of fulfilment and it
infringes freedom of opinion itself, which is a fundamental part of the right secured by Article
42

Article 35a, 2. Regulation 1060/2009 as introduced by Article 1(22) of Regulation 462/2013.

4

This article tries to overcome over-reliance by financial institutions on credit ratings.
Article 35a, 1. Regulation 1060/2009 as introduced by Article 1(22) of Regulation 462/2013.

44

Article 5a, 1. Regulation 1060/2009 as inserted by Article 1(6) Regulation 462/2013.
Article 35a, 1. Regulation 1060/2009 as introduced by Article 1(22) of Regulation 462/2013. See for an
analysis of the remaining problems under the Regulation on credit rating agencies and further references: De
Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supra note 19, at 123-125; De Bruyne, supranote 4, at 196-199.
47 See Human Rights News, Views & Info, EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, https://rightsinfo.org/therights-in-the-european-convention/.
48 Case 5493/72, Handyside v the UnitedKingdom, [1976]
ECHR 5, paragraph 49.
4
See De Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supra note 12, at 304.
so Case 9815/82, Lingens v Austria, [1986] ECHR 7, paragraph 46; Dirk Voorhoof, Guaranteeingthe freedom
and independence of the media, in Media and Democracy 45 (Council of Europe 1998).
45
4
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10 of the Convention." Value judgments thus receive more protection than factual
5
statements. 51 Value judgments, especially the "strong" ones,2
benefit from a wide, almost
absolute protection as long as the opinion put forward is not lacking any factual basis and is
made in good faith. The communicator of the information has to act in good faith and
ensure that the statement is based on sufficient facts to constitute a "fair comment." 5 4 Value
judgments without a sufficient factual basis may thus be excessive, which the government is
allowed to regulate and restrict.
One might think ratings are value judgments. Arguably, they are based on
information provided by the issuer of financial instruments or on information that is publicly
available. Therefore, ratings will probably have a sufficient basis in fact. It is also conceivable
that CRAs will in most cases issue the rating in good faith without knowing that it is flawed
or unreliable. 56 Taking into account the precautionary wording used by CRAs in their terms
and conditions,s ratings could be qualified as subjective assessments of information, facts, or

" Case 9815/82, Lingens v Austria, [1986] ECHR 7, paragraph 46; Case 11662/85, Oberschlick v. Austria,
[1991] ECHR 30, paragraph 63. Also see: Wolfgang Sakulin, Trademark Protection and Freedom of
Expression: An Inquiry Into the Conflict Between Trademark Rights and Freedom of Expression Under
European Law 112 (1" ed. 2011).
52 Oliver Castendyk, E. J. Dommering & Alexander Scheuer, European Media Law 55 referring to case law (l
ed. 2008).
- Jean-Frangois Flauss, The European Courtof Human Rights and the Freedom of Expression, 3 Ind. L.J. 809,
817 (2009) with further references to case law (e.g. Jerusalem v Austria (Case 26958/95) [2003] 37 EHRR 567;
De Haesand Gifsels v Belgium (Case 19983/92) [1997] 25 EHRR 1). See for example: Case 29723/11, Szima v
Hungary, [2012] ECHR 1788, paragraph 30 and the discussion in Monica Macovei, A guide to the
implementation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 10 & 50-52 (Human rights
handbooks 2004).
5 Javier Garcia Roca & Pablo Santolaya, Europe of Rights: A Compendium on the European Convention of
Human Rights 379 with further references to case law (1" 2012).
5
See e.g. Case 26958/95, Jerusalem v Austria, [2003] 37 EHRR 567, paragraph 43; Case 19983/92, De Haes
and Gysels v Belgium, [1997] 25 EHRR 1, paragraph 47; Case 10807/04, Veraart v. the Netherlands, [2008] 46
EHRR, November 30, 2006, paragraph 55. Also see: Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of
Human Rights 362 with references to several decisions (3d ed. 2011); Macovei, supra note 53, at 10; De
Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supranote 12, at 309.
56 In this regard, reference can be made the situation in the US where deceived investors
have at several
occasions targeted CRAs alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and
the thereunder promulgated SEC Rule 1Ob-5. Claims under Rule lOb-5 require a plaintiff to establish the CRA
made a material misrepresentation or omitted to disclose material information (that is a misstatement or
omission of material fact) with scienter in connection with the purchase or sale of securities justifiably relied on
by plaintiffs and proximately causing them injury. Scienter has been defined by the Supreme Court as a "mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud" (Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 551 U.S. 308,
319 (2007); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-194 (1976)). Prior to the enactment of the DoddFrank Act, a plaintiff thus had to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the CRA
acted with scienter. CRAs had to act with the intention to deceive, manipulate or defraud (15 U.S.C § 78u-4,
(b)(2)(A)). Investors did not always succeed in proving such a strong inference that the CRA acted with
scienter (e.g. In re National Century FinancialEnterprise,580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (S.D. Ohio 2008)).
" For instance, Moody's Code of Professional Conduct stipulates that "MIS is in no way providing a guarantee
with regard to the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of factual information reflected, or contained, in the
Credit Rating or any related MIS publication" (Moody's, Code of Professional Conduct, June 2017, 7,
https://www.moodys.com/uploadpage/Mco%20Documents/Documentsjprofessionalconduct.pdf).
Paragraph
7.2. in the S&P's Code of Conduct indicates that "Ratings do not constitute investment, financial, or other
advice [...] Credit Ratings do not comment on the suitability of an investment for a particular investor and
should not be relied on when making any investment decision [...] Credit Ratings are not verifiable statements
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products. Ratings might thus constitute a "fair comment"58 worth of protection as value
judgment. However, this conclusion is too far-stretching and needs to be placed in a more
nuanced perspective for two reasons.
First, the way in which CRAs come to their conclusions shows that the rating is not
merely a subjective assessment of the rated product. It is not equivalent to editorials or
opinions given by journalists. For example, it has already been mentioned that CRAs are
required to use rigorous, systematic, and continuous methodologies under Article 8 of the EU
Regulation on CRAs. 9 In addition, a CRA has to adopt, implement, and enforce adequate
measures to ensure its ratings are based on a thorough analysis of all the available and
relevant information. CRAs have to adopt all necessary measures to safeguard and ensure that
the information they use in assigning a rating is of sufficient quality and comes from reliable
sources. The Australian Bathurst decision also illustrates that the truth and accuracy of
credit ratings might be susceptible of proof. S&P did not develop its own model for rating
CPDOs, but instead relied on the model created by ABN Amro. The CRA did not give any
consideration to the model risk when assigning the credit rating.61 S&P adopted a 15%
volatility figure which had been provided to it by ABN Amro. There was no evidence that
S&P checked the 15% volatility figure itself. However, S&P could have easily calculated the
volatility and would then have realized-that the correct figure was around 28%. A reasonable
and prudent CRA would have done its own calculations and surely not have adopted a
volatility figure of 15%.62 Against this background, the court held that the analysis of S&P
did not comprise mere mistakes or errors ofjudgment. Rather, it "involve[s] failures of such a
character that no reasonable ratings agency exercising reasonable care and skill could have
committed in the rating of the CPDOs". In sum, the "[rating] analysis was fundamentally
flawed, unreasonable and irrational in numerous respects."6 3
Second, judgments of the ECtHR take into account the specific context in which the
statement is made to determine its protection.6 4 The contextual factors clearly do not speak to
the benefit of CRAs when it comes to the protection of their ratings as value judgement. The
Regulation on CRAs, for instance, is clear when stipulating ratings are not opinions about a
value or a price for a financial instrument or a financial obligation. CRAs are not financial
analysts or investment advisors. Ratings have regulatory value for investors such as credit
institutions, insurance companies or investors. Credit ratings drive investment choices notably

of fact" (Standard & Poor's Rating Services, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services Code of Conduct, December
31, 2015, 8, www.maalot.co.il/publications/PAR20160316144028.pdf).
58 Garcia Roca & Santolaya, supra note 54,
at 379.
Article 8 Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies. See in this regards also: Article 4 (defining
rigorous), Article 5 (defining systematic) and Article 6 (defining continuous) of the Commission Delegated
Regulation 447/2012.
60 Article 8 Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies; De Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supranote 12, at 309310.
61 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200,
paragraphs 2547, 2555-2590.
62 Id. at paragraphs 2611-2669.
63 Id. at paragraph 2836; ABNAMRO BankNVv BathurstRegional Council [2014] FCAFC 65,
paragraphs 12,
566-722; Jan De Bruyne, Liability of CreditRatingAgencies RegulatoryChanges & Tendencies in Case Law
Followingthe FinancialCrisis,(27) I.C.C.L.R. 87 (2016).
64 Garcia Roca & Santolaya, supra note 54, at 379 with further references to case law; Wolfgang Benedek
Matthias C. Kettemann, Freedom of expression and the Internet 89 (1" ed. 2014).
&

5
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because of information asymmetries and efficiency purposes.6 5 The market values ratings as
certification and benchmark and not as a mere opinion or information. Ratings are often
required by law or by the market, which indicates that they are not the equivalent of
editorials. 66
B.

Protection for Credit Ratings Under Article 10 ECHR as Factual Statements

.

Value judgments receive more protection than statements of facts under Article 10
ECHR. That is because factual statements can be proven true or false, which paves the way
68
to impose liability on CRAs when their credit ratings are inaccurate. CRAs, especially when
issuing unsolicited ratings, argue that they act as member of the press. The freedom of press
has obtained the greatest protection by the ECtHR under Article 10.69 The press does not only
have the task of disseminating information and ideas on matters of public interest, but the
public also has a right to receive them. 70 The press would be unable to play its vital role of
"public watchdog" if this was different
At several occasions, the ECtHR held that Article 10 protects a journalist's right to
divulge information even when the respective facts prove to be untrue if a journalist or a
publication has a legitimate purpose, the publication covers a matter of public concern, and
reasonable efforts have been made to verify the facts. The safeguard afforded by Article 10
to journalists in relation to reporting on issues of general interest is subject to the requirement
that they are acting in good faith on an accurate factual basis, and provide reliable and precise
information in accordance with the ethics of journalism. The problem with the protection of
ratings does not necessarily lie in the requirement that credit rating agencies have to act in
good faith. CRAs will in most cases act in good faith when issuing their ratings, even without
knowing they are flawed or inaccurate. Moreover, the rating will also most likely be based on

&

6 Recital (8) Regulation 462/2013 amending Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies.
66 Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, Financial
Oversight of Enron: The SEC and
Private-Sector Watchdogs, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, October 7, 2006, 97; De Bruyne
Vanleenhove, supranote 12, at 310.
67 See for example: Case 9815/82, Lingens v Austria, [1986] ECHR 7, paragraph
46; Case 29723/11, Szima v
Hungary [2012] ECHR 1788, paragraph 30.
68 Case 9815/82, Lingens v Austria, [1986] ECHR 7, paragraph 46; Case 11662/85,
Oberschlick v Austria,
[1991] ECHR 30 paragraph 63. Also see: Sakulin, supra at note 51, at 112.
69 Garcia Roca & Santolaya, supra note
54, at 379.
70 See for example: Case 13585/88, Observer and Guardian v the United Kingdom,
[1991] 14 EHRR 153,
paragraph 75; Case 15890/89, JersildvDenmark, [1994] ECHR 33, paragraph 31.
n Case 51279/99, Colombani and Others v France, [2002] ECHR 5, paragraph 55; Case 13778/88, Thorgeir
Thorgeirson v Iceland, [1992] 14 EHRR 843, paragraph 63; Case 28525/95, Unabhdngige Initiative
Informationsvielfalt v Austria, [2003] 37 EHRR 33, paragraph 37; Case 15890/89, Jersildv Denmark, [1994]
ECHR 33, paragraph. 30; De Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supra note 12, at 311.
7 See for example: Case 29183/95, Fressoz and Roire v France, [1999] ECHR 1, paragraph 54; Case
13704/88, Schwabe v Austria, [1993] 14 HRLJ, paragraph 34. See for a discussion and further references:
Macovei, supra note 53, at 10, 24 & 50-51; Mario Oetheimer, Freedom of Expression in Europe: Case-law
Concerning Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights 19-20 (Council of Europe Publishing
2007).
7 Case 29183/95, Fressoz and Roire v France, [1999] ECHR 1, paragraph 54; Case 21980/93, Bladet Tromso
and Stensaas v Norway, [2000] 29 EHRR 125, paragraph 65; Case 51279/99, Colombani and Others v France,
[2002] ECHR 5, paragraph 65; Case 17488/90, Goodwin v United Kingdom, [1996] 22 EHRR 12, paragraph
39.
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an accurate factual basis (e.g. information provided by the issuer). There are two bigger
concerns that might restrict the protection of ratings as factual statements under Article 10
ECHR. Whereas the first relates to the notion of public interest, the second concerns the
definition of members of the press traditionally protected by Article 10.
First, ratings have to contribute to a public debate on a matter of general interest if
they want to receive protection under Article 10 ECHR. 7 4 The ECtHR frequently holds that,
although the press should not overstep the boundaries set inter alia for the protection of the
76
reputation of others, 5 the need to prevent disclosure of confidential information or the
7
safeguard of the interests of proper administration of justice, it is incumbent on it to impart
S78
information and ideas on political issues "just as on those in other areas of public interest".
The duty of the press is to convey information and ideas on all matters or ongoing debates on
questions of public interest in a way that is consistent with its obligations and
responsibilities.79
As a consequence, not only political expressions are protected. The general interest
also relates to issues that arouse public concern among citizens in general.so The public
interest involves anything affecting the rights, health, or finances of the public at large. The
public interest is a common concern among citizens in the management and affairs of local,
state and national governments.8 It is the benefit or advantage of the community as a whole8
and relates to the fact that the public has a right to know about something as it affects them. 83
For example, this includes a publication regarding the earnings and pay raises of the
managing director of a company. The ECtHR held in Fressoz and Roire that the purpose of
the published article was not to infringe upon the rights of the company chairman but to
"contribute to the more general debate on a topic that interested the public [employment and
pay]." 84 The publication can also relate to important aspects of human health (e.g. cosmetic
surgery such as in the PIP case) and raise issues affecting the public interest, even if the
article was not published as part of an ongoing general debate, but focused on the standard of
treatment provided in a single clinic."

74

Case 29183/95, Fressoz and Roire v France, [1999] ECHR 1, paragraph 50; Case 13704/88, Schwabe v

Austria, [1993] 14 HRLJ, paragraph 34; Case 21980/93, Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway, [2000] 29
EHRR 125, paragraph 68.
" Case 9815/82, Lingens v Austria, [1986] ECHR 7, paragraph 41.
76 Case 21980/93, Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway, [2000] 29 EHRR 125, paragraph 59.
" Case 22714/93, Worm v Austria [1998] 25 EHRR 454, paragraph 50.
78 Case 9815/82, Lingens v Austria, [1986] ECHR 7, paragraph 41.
7
Case 19983/92, De Haes and Gisels v Belgium, [1997] 25 EHRR 1, paragraph 37; Case 51279/99,
Colombani and Others v France [2002] ECHR 5, paragraph 55; Case 26131/95, Bergens Tidende and Others v
Norway, [2001] 31 EHRR 430, paragraph 49; Bladet Tromse and Stensaas v Norway, [2000] 29 EHRR 125,
paragraph 59; De Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supra note 12, at 312.
8o Garcia Roca & Santolaya, supra note 54, at 377.
81 See "public interest" on the Free (Legal) Dictionary, legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Public+lnterest.
82 See "public interest" in the Oxford Dictionaries, www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/publicinterest.
8 See "public interest" in the MacMillan Dictionary, www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/publicinterest.
84 Case 29183/95, Fressozand Roire v France, [1999] ECHR 1, paragraph
50.
8 Case 26131/95, Bergens Tidende and Others v Norway, [2001] 31 EHRR 430, paragraph 51; Case 25181/94,
Hertel v Switzerland [1998] 28 EHRR 534, paragraph 47. Also see: Garcia Roca & Santolaya, supranote 54, at
377; De Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supra note 12, at 312.
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It is unlikely that ratings will contribute to a public debate on a matter of general
interest worth of protection. To start with, ratings do necessarily relate to a matter of general
or public concern. For instance, reference can be made to case law in the U.S. as a source of
inspiration. Courts in the U.S. already held that ratings of complex asset-backed securities
leading to the 2008 financial crisis were not a matter of public concern but were issued to the
benefit of only a few sophisticated investors.1 6 When looking at the cases where the ECtHR
did grant broader protection to statements or articles, one sees that such articles and
statements are published within an entire different context than ratings. Most statements that
have been granted protection under Article 10 ECHR because of their link with the public
debate or general interest deal with defamed politicians or other (prominent) public persons
(e.g. police men, civil servants, politicians, judges and journalists). 7
Yet, there might be some ways to link the issuance of certain ratings with the
general or public interest. Recital (8) of Regulation 462/2013 stipulates that CRAs have to be
registered and supervised as their services have a considerable impact on the "public
interest."8 8 Particularly, sovereign ratings given to a country or sovereign entity are important
in this regard. Sovereign ratings could indeed affect debates of public interest because they
pertain to an important political issue of outstanding political interest affecting both today's
and the following generations, namely the ability of states to repay their loans.9
Even when assuming ratings do indeed relate to a matter of general or public
concern, it remains unlikely they contribute to a public debate. It will mostly be only one
CRA that issues a rating for a particular instrument. It is therefore unlikely that there is an
ongoing debate, regardless of the question of whether it concerns a matter of general or public
concern. An exception might occur with sovereign ratings or with ratings given to certain
multinational companies headquartered in a country. A (potential) downgrade of a given
rating can lead to a discussion at the political level and in the financial press.9 0
It is also not the actual rating that contributes to a debate, but the underlying facts
leading to the default of the financial instrument or issuer. Moreover, the consequences of
incorrect ratings leading to the financial crisis illustrate that the general public only becomes
aware of the role of the CRA once such catastrophic events have occurred. This is long after
the actual issuance of the rating. Thus, a public debate only arises once the rating has been
issued and the rated item defaults. An exception can occur for some ratings, where there
might be a public debate about the financial health of an institution/country preceding the
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 651. F. Supp. 2d 155, 175-176 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); In Re National Century Financial Enterprise Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 640-648 (S.D. Ohio 2008);
Anschutz Corp. v. Merill Lynch & Co, 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 831-832 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
87 See for example: Case 9815/82, Lingens v Austria, [1986] ECHR
7 (Austrian Chancellor); Case 28114/95,
86

Dalban v Romania, [2001] 31 EHRR (prominent figures); Case 37698/97, Lopes Gomes da Silva v Portugal,
[2002] 34 EHRR 56 (candidate in municipal elections); Case 11508/85, Barfod v Denmark, [1989] 13 EHRR
493 (lay judges); Case 41205/98, Tammer v Estonia, [2001] ECHR 263 (politician's assistant); Case 29271/95,
Dichandand others v Austria (Chair of a parliamentary legislative committee); Case 53984/00, Radio France
and Othersv France, [2005] 40 EHRR 706 (former deputy prefect); Case 15974/90, Pragerand Oberschlick v
Austria, [1996] 21 EHRR I (judges); Case 11798/85, Castells v Spain, [1992] 14 EHRR 445 (Basque militant
and member of the Spanish Parliament).
8 Recital (8) of Regulation 462/2013 amending Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies.
89 J. Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental
Right 251 (1" 2015).
See for example: G. Reilhac & A. Breidthardt, EU slams ratings agencies
after Portugal downgraded,
Reuters, July 6, 2011, www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone/eu-slams-ratings-agencies-after-portugaldowngraded-idUSTRE7651EK20110706.
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issuance of the rating. In any case, the existence of a freedom of speech defense does not
enhance the public debate with regard to ratings.
Second, even if ratings would contribute to the more general debate on a topic of
general interest, there might be another argument to deny CRAs the broad protection under
the freedom of expression. Credit rating agencies will likely not be qualified as journalists to
whom the ECtHR traditionally grants broad protection under Article 10 ECHR. CRAs do not
comment on facts that contribute to the public debate such as the behavior of a Chancellor in
an Austrian magazine91 or a complaint on the inactivity on the part of the authorities with
regard to numerous attacks and murders that took place in the Basque Country. 92 Labelling
CRAs as journalists is also not straightforward when looking over the fence to case law by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). In Tietosuojavaltuutettuv Satakunnan Markkinaporssi Oy,
the ECJ established a test of what comprises "journalistic purposes." The Court defined
journalistic purposes as referred to in Article 9 of Directive 95/46/EC 9 3 as encompassing all
activities with the "sole object of [...] the disclosure to the public, irrespective of the medium
which is used to transmit them, of information, opinions or ideas."9 4 It remains unclear
whether CRAs, even when issuing unsolicited sovereign ratings, pursue the sole objective of
disclosing information to the public.
C.

Protection for Credit Ratings Under Article 10 ECHR as Commercial Speech

Credit rating agencies could also argue that their ratings qualify as commercial
speech, which deserves protection as well under Article 10 ECHR. The European Court of
Human Rights does not make a distinction between various forms of speech and expression.
Consequently, all forms of expressions, whatever their content, fall within the scope of
Article 10 ECHR. This also includes commercial speech. The legal status of a company or
the fact that its activities are commercial and profit-making cannot deprive the statement of
protection under Article 10. 9 7 In other words, speech does not necessarily fall outside the
scope of Article 10 of the ECHR by reason of the content of the publication and the nature of

91 Case 9815/82, Lingens vAustria, [1986] ECHR 7.
92 Case 11798/85, Castells v Spain, [1992]
14 EHRR 445.
93 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281.
94 Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinaparssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, December 16,
2008 paragraph 62; De Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supra note 12, at 313-314.
" Case 10737/84, Mailer v Switzerland, [1991] 13 EHRR 212 paragraph 27.
96 In Casado Coca v Spain, the ECtHR held that the freedom of speech does not apply solely to certain types of
information, ideas or forms of expression in particular those of a political nature. It also encompasses artistic
expression and information of a commercial nature (Case 15450/89, Casado Coca v Spain, [1994] 18 EHRR 1,
paragraph 35). In Mailer and others v Switzerland, the Court concluded Article 10 ECHR did not specify that
freedom of artistic expression comes within its ambit. However, it does also not distinguish between various
forms of expression. It includes freedom to receive and impart information and ideas which affords the
opportunity to take part in the public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all
kinds. As such, this also includes commercial speech (Case 10737/84, MaIler v Switzerland, [1991] 13 EHRR
212, paragraph 27). The Court in Jakubowski noted that freedom of expression exercised in another way than in
discussions of matters of public interest (e.g. commercial speech) does not deprive it of the protection under
Article 10 ECHR (Case 15088/89, Jakubowski v Germany [1994] 19 EHRR 64, paragraph 25). See in this
regard also: Oetheimer, supra note 72, at 82.
9 Case 12726/87, Autronic AG v Switzerland, [1990] ECHR 12, paragraphs 44-48.
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the disseminator's activities.9 The fact that a person defends a given interest, whether it is an
economic interest or any other interest, does not deprive him of the benefit of freedom of
expression. 99
However, several decisions show that commercial speech is given less protection
than political expressions. 00 For instance, the European Commission of Human Rights held
in Church of Scientology v. Sweden that commercial speech does not fall outside the
protection given by Article 10 ECHR. The level of protection should, nonetheless, be less
than that accorded to expressions of political ideas.10 The wider margin of appreciation for
national authorities when it comes to commercial speech, which is further discussed in part
IV, also illustrates commercial speech is offered less protection under Article 10 ECHR than
political expressions. In Demuth v. Switzerland, the ECtHR, for example, the court concluded
that the standard of scrutiny for the national authorities' margin of appreciation may be less
severe for commercial speech. 102 The obvious question is whether ratings can be considered
as commercial speech and thus also deserving of protection under Article 10 ECHR.10 3
Ratings could, on the one hand, be qualified as commercial speech because they
intend to promote and further the sale of the financial instruments even if CRAs or their
ratings contribute to an on-going general debate.' 04 It is the specific context in which the
rating was issued that determines whether it is commercial speech or not. Solicited ratings
could in one way or another qualify as commercial speech. Favorable credit ratings stimulate
the interests of investors to purchase securities that are covered by such ratings. 10 5 Credit
ratings fall inside the "regular commercial context in the sense of inciting the public to
purchase a particular product."'0 6 Optimistic ratings of complex securities often promote and
further the sale of the issuer's securities. Investors are more likely to invest in companies that
have a high rating. Phrased differently, securities leading to the financial crisis would not
have been sold successfully if they did not have an advantageous rating. Such ratings are
issued in the interest of the CRA and its audience.'07

98 Case 10572/83, Markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v Germany, [1990] 12 EHRR 161,

paragraphs 25-26.
9 Joint dissenting opinion in Case 10572/83, Markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v Germany,
[1990] 12 EHRR 161, part I; De Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supra note 12, at 314-315.
100 See in this regard also: D. Harris, M. O'Boyle & C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human
Rights 397 (l' 1995).
' Case 7805/77, X and Church of Scientology v Sweden, [1979] 16 DR 68, paragraph 5. See for a discussion:
A T Yutaka, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of
the ECHR 107 (1" ed. 2002).
102 Case 38743/97, Demuth v. Switzerland, [2002] 38 EHRR 423, paragraph 42.
'03 See in this regard for example: J. Krzeminska-Vamvaka, Freedom of Commercial Speech in Europe,
Research Training Network Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the European Union, 10-14 identifying
three tendencies in decisions by the ECtHR concerning the qualification of commercial speech. First, speech
can be labelled commercial by using balancing factors, which implies that one should look at the interest which
is served by the speech. Second, the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech can be
determined by applying the public debate test. Third, the commercial character of the speech can be determined
by the enterprise's commercial objectives.
1o See in this regard for example: Case 38743/97, Demuth v Switzerland, [2002] 38 EHRR 423, paragraph 41.
'0o Case 7805/77, X andChurch ofScientology v Sweden, [1979] 16 DR 68, paragraph 5.
' Case 24699/94, VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland, [2002] 34 EHRR 159, paragraph 57.
'o' See in this regard also the different cases in the United States discussed supra in parts I and III.B; De
Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supra note 12, at 315.
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On the other hand, there are also decisions that do not consider whether statements
aim to promote products and further their sale to label them as commercial. Instead, they
focus on the interests served by the statement. These decisions take into account the extent to
which statements have a wider impact on society when deciding on the applicability of
Article 10.10 For instance, protection is given to notices that contain a lawyer's name,
profession, address and telephone number which are not only published with the aim of
advertising but also provide persons requiring legal assistance with information that is of
definite use and likely to facilitate their access to justice.109 If statements do not have such a
wide impact on society, they are more likely to qualify as commercial speech, and thus
110
Even if the statement contains factual
benefit from less protection under Article 10 ECHR.
data and assertions regarding the speaker or his business, these components can overlap to
make up a whole, the gist of which is the expression of opinions and the imparting of
information on a "topic of general interest" (e.g. public health). In such circumstances, it is
not possible to dissociate from this whole, those elements that go more to manner of
presentation than to substance and which have a publicity-like effect."'
Thus, the question arises whether ratings have such a wider impact on society. This
needs to be seen in connection with the previously discussed circumstances under which
ratings affect the public interest or can be qualified as a matter of general concern."2
Certainly, CRAs can have a public role to the extent that third parties rely on their ratings to
make decisions. Such a public role has even been acknowledged in Belgium for other
certifiers in such classification societies as the maritime sector,"' auditors in the financial
5
Yet, it remains unsure whether credit
sector1 4 and notified bodies in the medical sector."
ratings actually relate to the imparting of information on a topic of general interest. Ratings
themselves do not necessarily contribute to a general debate on a topic of general interest.
Instead, the underlying facts and role of CRAs in a particular scandal can become the subject
of public debate long after the ratings have been issued. Thus, with the exception of sovereign
ratings, it will not be easy to show that ratings relate to the imparting of information on a
topic of general interest.

108 Krzeminska-Vamvaka also concludes that several cases show that the distinction between commercial and
non-commercial speech is determined by the "public debate test" (Krzeminska-Vamvaka, supra note 103, at
11-12).
1o' Case 15450/89, Casado Coca v Spain, [1994] 18 EHRR 1, paragraph 33-36.
no Krzeminska-Vamvaka, supra note 103, at 11-12.
"n Case 8734/79, Barthold v Germany, [1985] 7 EHRR 383, paragraphs 40-42; De Bruyne & Vanleenhove,
supra note 12, at 316-317.
112 See in this regard the discussion supra in part
III.B.
"' See for example: Court of Appeal Antwerp, February 14, 1995, Rechtspraak Haven van Antwerpen 321
(1995); Court of Appeal Antwerp, May 10, 1994, Rechtspraak Haven van Antwerpen 301 (1995).
114 See for example: Court of First Instance Brussels, December 12, 1996, Tijdschrift voor Rechtspersoon en
Vennootschap 41-42 (1997).
115 See for example: C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v TUV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH, February 16, 2017,
paragraphs 50-53 (PIP breast implant case).
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IV. RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER ARTICLE 10
ECHR
Regardless of the level of protection given to speech under Article 10 ECHR, the
freedom of expression can be subject to exceptions and restrictions. These exceptions and
restrictions must be construed strictly and established by clear and convincing evidence.6
Even if assuming that ratings would qualify as protected speech, governments are allowed to
restrict the CRA's freedom of speech by imposing liability for an allegedly inaccurate rating.
Freedom of speech can be restricted under the conditions in the second paragraph of Article
10 ECHR. More specifically, it has to be established whether the government's interference
with and restriction of the freedom of expression is prescribed by law (part A), pursues a
legitimate interest included in the second paragraph (part B) and is necessary in a democratic
society to achieve the legitimate interest (C). 1 17
A.

Restriction of the CRA's Freedom of Expression Prescribed by Law

In most cases dealing with the protection of speech, the requirement that the
restriction needs to be prescribed by law is not the major problem.1 18 The interference can be
prescribed by law through legislation prohibiting the spreading of false and misleading
information. 1 9 Moreover, the basis for tort liability following from, for instance, Article 1382
in the Belgian Civil Code (BCC), can be considered 'law' under the second paragraph of
Article 10 ECHR. 120 The law must be accessible, clear, and sufficiently precise, enabling
citizens to regulate their conduct. 121 This is the case for Article 1382 BCC taking into account
the extensive case law on that provision published and discussed in overviews and academic
Case 25181/94, Hertel v Switzerland, [1998] 28 EHRR 534, paragraph 46; Case 5493/72, Handyside v the
United Kingdom [1976] ECHR 5 paragraph 49; Case 15890/89, Jersild v Denmark, [1994] ECHR 33,
paragraph 37.
117 See for example: Case 10572/83, Markt intern Verlag GmbH
and Klaus Beermann v Germany, [1990] 12
EHRR 161, paragraphs 25-38; Case 13778/88, Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland, [1992] 14 EHRR 843,
paragraphs 55-70; Case 8734/79, Bartholdv Germany (Case 8734/79) [1985] 7 EHRR 383 paragraphs 44-59.
Also see: De Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supra note 12, at 317-321.
us See for example in the context of commercial speech: Case 10572/83, Markt intern Verlag GmbH and
Klaus Beermann v Germany, [19901 12 EHRR 161 (interference was based on Section 1 of the 1909 Unfair
Competition Act); Case 7805/77, X and Church of Scientology v Sweden, [1979] 16 DR 68 (interference was
based on the Marketing Improper Practices Act); Case 15450/89, Casado Coca v Spain 1994, 18 EHRR 1
(interference was based on the Statute of the Spanish Bar and by the Statute of the Barcelona Bar); Case
37928/97, Stambuk v Germany, [2002] 37 EHRR 845 (interference was based on sections 25 and 27 of the
Baden-Worttemberg Rules of Professional Conduct of the Medical Practitioners' Council and sections 55 and
58 of the Baden-Worttemberg Act on the Councils for the Medical Professions).
...Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive
84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 149 and Directive
2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and
comparative advertising, OJ L 376.
120 Court of Appeal Ghent, June 6, 2005, 129 Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 1247 (2005).
121 Case 26229/95, Gaweda v. Poland, [2002] ECHR 301, paragraph 39; Case 8691/79, Malone v The United
Kingdom, [1984] ECHR 10, paragraph 67; Case 23224/94, Kopp v Switzerland, [1998] ECHR 18, paragraph
55.
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journals. 1 2 2 Belgian courts already held that freedom of expression does not provide immunity
from liability in torts based on Article 1382 BCC.12' Thus, Article 10 ECHR allows holding
CRAs liable for an incorrect rating if the resulting limitation of the freedom of expression is
12 4
necessary for one of the purposes mentioned in the second paragraph of that Article.
B.

Restriction of the CRA's Freedom of Expression Pursues a Legitimate Interest

The second requirement will also not be a major challenge in the context of
CRAs.125 The restriction by imposing liability can pursue a legitimate aim such as protecting
the interest of the public in general, the rights of market participants, or the reputation of the
requesting entities. The creditworthiness of an entity that is to be rated is actually nothing
more than its financial reputation. Therefore, imposing liability on CRAs for ratings that
affect this reputation does not violate their freedom of speech. 126
At the same time, however, persons or entities that have a public function or occupy
a position that is in the public's interest because of their function or position have to endure
more public comments and criticism than an anonymous citizen. 127 In this regard, a
comparison can be made to critical reviews in restaurant guides. A restaurant owner cannot
object to the review of his restaurant in a guide because a person running a business in a
democratic society should expect that this business will be the subject of criticism.128 The
same goes to some extent for critical reviews of activities in the capital markets affecting the
interests of the public participating in these markets.129 For instance, the fact that the
published rating incorrectly reflects the creditworthiness of the rated entity in itself is not
enough to render the CRA liable. Entities entering the capital markets for investment
purposes should expect their financial reputations to become an issue that will be publicly
Court of Appeal Ghent, June 6, 2005, 129 Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 1247 (2005).
Court of Appeal Antwerp, October 11, 2005, 2 Auteur en Media 207 (2006) with annotation by K.
Lemmens; Court of Appeal Brussels, September 20, 2001, 6 Auteur en Media 524 (2002); Court of First
Instance Brussels, October 7, Auteur en Media 80 (2003); Court of Appeal Brussels, January 16, 2001, 3
Auteur en Media 282 (2002); Court of First Instance Antwerp, January 9, 2006, 1 Auteur en Media 97 (2006);
Court of First Instance, Antwerp, December 21, 2000, Algemeen Juridisch Tijdschrift 557 (2001); Court of
Appeal, Ghent, March 28, 2002, 13 Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 465 (2003); Court of Appeal Ghent, June 6,
2005, 129 Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 2005, 1243; Court of First Instance Tongeren, April 12, 2013, 43
Limburgs Rechtsleven 132 (2017). See in this regard also the discussion and further references in Marc Van
Quickenborne & Hugo Vandenberghe, "Overzicht van rechtspraak. Aansprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad.
2000-2008", 4 Tijdschrift voor Privaat Recht 1816 (2010); J. Corbet, Censures: Actes du colloque du 16 mai
2003 85-89 (1st. ed. 2003); Dirk Voorhoof, Vritheid van meningsuiting en drukpersvritheid in: Handboek
Belgisch publiek recht, Deel 1: inleiding tot bet Belgisch publiek recht 597 (Johan Vande Lanotte, Geert
Goedertier, Yves Haeck, Jurgen Goossens & Tom De Pelsmaeker eds. 2015).
124 Wymeersch & Kruithof, supra note 2, at 386; Hugo Vandenberghe, Over persaansprakelykheid De
specifieke context, 4 Tijdschrift voor Privaat Recht 1816 (2010).
125 This, for example, includes the protection of the reputation and the rights of others (Case 10572/83, Markt
intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v Germany, [1990] 12 EHRR 161), of the interests of the public
while ensuring respect for members of the Bar (Case 15450/89, Casado Coca v Spain, [1994] 18 EHRR 1),
rights of consumers (Case 7805/77, X. and Church of Scientology v Sweden, [1979] 16 DR 68) and health or
the rights of others (Case 37928/97, Stambuk v Germany, [2002] 37 EHRR 845).
126 Wymeersch & Kruithof, supranote 2, at 386.
127 Id. at 386-387.
128 Commercial Court Antwerp, December 6, 1990, Jaarboek Handelspraktijken 511 (1990).
129 Wymeersch & Kruithof, supranote 2, at
386-387.
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discussed. For the same reasons, they should accept that inaccuracies in these public
discussions are inevitable and might sometimes even cause fluctuations in the public opinion
about their creditworthiness. Entities such as CRAs contribute to the production of
information in the business and capital markets. Therefore, they should enjoy some leeway.1 3 0
In order to permit sufficient voluntary production of information that is beneficial for the
financial sector and the society in general, a strict standard of liability for any information that
turns out to be incorrect should not be upheld.' Nonetheless, the situation for CRAs is still
quite different than a critical review of a restaurant or other market participants written by a
journalist. Journalists do not get paid and issue the information about the restaurant to the
benefit of the general public. CRAs, on the other hand, are paid by the issuer to give their
opinion on the latter's reputation. Credit ratings often follow from a contractual relationship
between the CRA and the issuer, which is atypical for a journalist. The journalist is not
directly involved in the commercial activities of the party on which he reports. In sum,
imposing liability on CRAs when issuing an incorrect rating might become necessary to
protect the reputation of the issuer or the interest of the general public.
C.

Restriction of the CRA's Freedom of Expression is Necessary in a Democratic
Society to Achieve the Legitimate Interest

When deciding if the restriction imposed by the government is necessary in a
democratic society, the ECtHR weighs opposing interests at stake in the particular case (e.g.
public health, consumer protection, protection of identity, fair competition, or the reputation
and rights of others against the freedom of expression). 3 2 In exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction, the ECtHR looks at the interference in the light of the case as a whole. This
includes the content and general context of the publication. ' The necessity test cannot be
applied in absolute terms but requires an assessment of various factors, including the nature of
the rights involved, the degree of the interference, whether the restriction was proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued, the nature of the public interest and the degree to which the latter
requires protection in the circumstances of the case.14
The adjective 'necessary' implies the existence of a "pressing social need". 3 s The
Court looks at the interference in the light of the case and determines if it was proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons invoked by the national authorities to
justify the restriction are relevant and sufficient.13 6 The Court confines its review to the
question of whether the measures taken by the government are justifiable in principle and
proportionate. In this regard, the margin of appreciation given to governments is essential to

30 Id. at 384-388.
ni Id. at 388.
132 Case 8734/79, Barthold v Germany, [1985] 7 EHRR 383, paragraph 58; Case 15088/89, Jakubowski v
Germany, [1994] 19 EHRR 64, paragraph 27; Case 24699/94, VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland,
[2002] 34 EHRR 159, paragraphs 67-79; Case 10572/83, Markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v
Germany, [1990] 12 EHRR 161, paragraphs 34.
"'s Case 37928/97, Stambuk v Germany, [2002] 37 EHRR 845, paragraph 38.
"' Case 7805/77, X and Church ofScientology v Sweden, [1979] 16 DR 68, paragraph 5.
35 Case 5493/72, Handyside v the UnitedKingdom, [1976]
ECHR 5, paragraph 48.
136 See e.g. Case 25181/94, Hertel v Switzerland, [1998] 28 EHRR
534, paragraph 46; Case 37928/97, Stambuk
v Germany, [2002] 37 EHRR 845, paragraph 38.
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regulate, restrict, or forbid speech. Two factors seem to have an influence on the margin of
appreciation and the stance that courts will take regarding the protection of ratings.
First, the margin of appreciation is wide and particularly essential for national
governments when it concerns (purely) commercial matters13 7 or advertisements. 138 In other
words, authorities have more discretion to regulate speech related to commercial matters or
advertisements than to value judgements. The ECtHR, nonetheless, recalled that a strict and
narrow margin of appreciation in cases of advertising and commercial matters for liberal
professions would not be consonant with the freedom of expression. A strict application risks
discouraging members of liberal professions from contributing to the public debate on topics
affecting the life of the community if there is the slightest likelihood of their statements being
treated as entailing an advertising effect.1 3 9 The government's margin of appreciation is,
however, reduced when the claim does not relate to an individual's purely commercial
statements or advertisements, but concerns a contribution to and participation in a debate
affecting the public at large/general interest. 140 This includes public health (e.g. effects of
microwaves on human health), 14 1 the protection of the rights of others, 14 2 and maintaining the
welfare of animals. 1 43
Against this background, the ECtHR concluded in several cases that a particular
restriction or injunction on the freedom of speech was not proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued, and accordingly, not necessary in a democratic society. This resulted in a violation
of Article 10 ECHR. Those decisions were especially related to statements that were not
purely within the commercial or advertising sphere but instead had a wider link to the
society.144 In several other cases, the ECtHR found that the injunctions were proportionate
and necessary. They did not constitute a violation of Article 10 ECHR. These cases in
particular were related to purely commercial statements or advertisements. .145
CRAs will probably argue that imposing liability for an incorrect rating is not
necessary in a democratic society. More specifically, they might claim their ratings are not
purely commercial statements or advertisements but instead have a wider link to the society

See e.g. Case 10572/83, Markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v Germany, [1990] 12 EHRR
161, paragraph 33-37; Case 15088/89, Jakubowski v Germany, [1994] 19 EHRR 64, paragraph 26; Case
24699/94, VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland, [2002] 34 EHRR 159, paragraph 69.
138 See e.g. Case 15450/89, Casado Coca v Spain, [1994] 18 EHRR 1, paragraph 50; Case 31611/96, Nikula v
'

Finland, [2004] 38 EHRR 45, paragraph 45; Case 37928/97, Stambuk v Germany, [2002] 37 EHRR 845,
paragraphs 38-54. See in this regard also: Steve Foster, Human Rights and Civil Liberties 359 (1t. 2008).
1"9 Case 8734/79, Barthold v Germany, [1985] 7 EHRR 383, paragraphs 52-59.
140 See e.g. Case 8734/79, Barthold v Germany, [1985] 7 EHRR 383, paragraph 58; Case 25181/94, Hertel v
Switzerland, [1998] 28 EHRR 534, paragraph 47; Case 24699/94, VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v
Switzerland, [2002] 34 EHRR 159, paragraph 71.
141

Case 25181/94, Hertel v Switzerland, [1998] 28 EHRR 534, paragraph 47.

Case 37928/97, Stambuk v Germany, [2002] 37 EHRR 845, paragraphs 46-49.
Case 24699/94, VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland, [2002] 34 EHRR 159, paragraphs 70-71.
'44 Case 8734/79, Barthold v Germany, [1985] 7 EHRR 383, paragraphs 52-59; Case 24699/94, VgT Verein
gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland, [2002] 34 EHRR 159, paragraphs 70-71; Case 37928/97, Stambuk v
Germany, [2002] 37 EHRR 845, paragraphs 46-49; Case 25181/94, Hertel v Switzerland, [1998] 28 EHRR
142

143

534, paragraph 47.
...See e.g. Case 10572/83, Markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v Germany, [1990] 12 EHRR
161, paragraphs 32-38; Case 15088/89, Jakubowski v Germany, [1994] 19 EHRR 64, paragraphs 23-30; Case
7805/77, X and Church of Scientology v Sweden, [1979] 16 DR 68, paragraph 5. See in this regard also:
Foster, supra note 138, at 359.
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(e.g. general welfare). The issuance of such ratings actually helps the wider public to receive
information on the rated product. This gives national authorities a restricted margin of
appreciation which means that a violation of Article 10 ECHR might be more easily
established. However, ratings could also fall within the definition of "advertising" often at
stake in cases dealing with commercial speech. 14 6 Advertising refers to the making of a
representation in any form in connection with a trade, business, or profession in order to
promote the supply of goods or services.1 47 The European Convention on Transfrontier
Television uses a similar wording when defining advertising as any public announcement in
return for payment or similar consideration or for self-promotional purposes, which is
intended to promote the sale, purchase, or rental of a product or service, to advance a cause or
idea or to bring about some other effect desired by the advertiser or the broadcaster itself. 148
Such a broad conception is not surprising from a comparative legal perspective within the EU
either. In the Belgian Electronic Sorting Technology case, the European Court of Justice,
decided that it was desirable to provide a broad concept of comparative advertising to cover
all modes of advertising. It is not limited to traditional forms of advertising, but also includes
very varied forms of promotional messages.1 4 9 Arguably, ratings given to complex securities
and leading to the financial crisis could be qualified as advertisements. Such ratings have
been issued to institutional investors to make commercial decisions. The financial products
would not have been sold if they were not covered by favorable ratings. A rating might be a
public announcement in return for payment.
Second, there is also another element that has an influence on the national
authorities' margin of appreciation, namely whether the provider of information has a more
public role in society. Lawyers, for instance, have a "central position in the administration of
justice as intermediaries between the public and the courts. Such a position explains the usual
restrictions on the conduct of members of the Bar and also the monitoring and supervisory
powers vested in Bar councils.",15o Members of the bar cannot be compared with commercial
undertakings such as insurance companies, which are not subject to restrictions on advertising
their legal consulting services."' Lawyers play a key role in ensuring courts enjoy confidence
from the public. Therefore, it is legitimate to expect them to contribute to the proper
administration of justice and thus to maintain public confidence therein. Lawyers are certainly
entitled to publicly comment on the administration of justice. However, their criticism must
not overstep certain bounds and restrictions on their freedom of expression may be justified.
Account must be taken of the need to strike the right balance between various interests
involved. These include the public's right to receive legal information, the requirements of the
proper administration of justice and the dignity of the legal profession.152 Similarly, the

"' See the conclusion by Maya Hertig Randall, Commercial Speech under the European Convention on
Human Rights: Subordinate or Equal?, 6 Human Rights Law Review 53, 59 (2006)
" Article 2(a) Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006
concerning misleading and comparative advertising, OJ L 376.
148 European Convention on Transfrontier Television, CETS No. 132, May 5, 1989 as referred to in Randall,
supra note 146, at 60.
" Case C
B6ilr ElectronicSorting Technology NVv Bert Peelaers Visys NV, paragraphs 21-26.
15o Case 15450/89, Casado Coca v Spain, [1994] 18 EHRR 1, paragraph 54; Case 25405/94, Schapfer v
Switzerland, [2001] 33 EHRR 845, paragraph 29.
'. Case 15450/89, Casado Coca v Spain, [1994] 18 EHRR 1, paragraph 53.
152 Case 31611/96, Nikula v Finland, [2004] 38 EHRR 45, paragraph 45; Case 25405/94, Schapfer v
Switzerland, [2001] 33 EHRR 845, paragraphs 29-30. Also see: Leach, supra note 56, at 368.
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medical practitioners' general professional obligation of care of the health of each individual
and of the community as a whole may explain restrictions on their conduct, including rules on
public communications or participation in public communications on professional issues.
These rules of conduct in relation to the press have to be balanced against the legitimate
interest of the public in information and are limited to preserve the well-function of the
profession as a whole."' Thus, national authorities might have a wider margin of appreciation
and a violation of Article 10 ECHR will be less easily established when the speaker fulfils a
15 4
more public role.
One can argue that CRAs to a certain extent have such a public role. This has been
acknowledged in Regulation. 462/2013 on CRAs which stipulates that ratings, whether issued
for regulatory purposes or not, have a significant impact on investment decisions and on the
image and financial attractiveness of issuers. 15 5 CRAs are important for participants in the
financial markets such as credit institutions and insurance companies. Ratings still drive
investment choices in particular because of information asymmetries and for efficiency
purposes. 15 6 The public role of other certifiers such as classification societies has already
explicitly been acknowledged by several decisions in Belgium.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

&

The article examined some issues related to credit rating agencies, thereby taking a
European perspective. Even though there is supranational legislation dealing with the liability
of CRAs, its application remains problematic due to several elements such as the high
threshold of proof (e.g. reasonable reliance on the rating and the impact on decision-making
processes). ss The contribution then proceeded with an analysis of a CRA's freedom of
expression pursuant to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This
question might become important considering that claims against CRAs can be initiated in
European countries. The Italian's Corte dei Conti already threated to prosecute Standard
Poor's as the CRA did not value Italy's historical and cultural treasures when downgrading
the sovereign rating.1' The aim of the article is to give judges in European countries a

Case 37928/97, Stambuk v Germany, [2002] 37 EHRR 845, paragraph 41.
Case 15450/89, [1994] 18 EHRR 1, paragraphs 54-55; Case 31611/96, Nikula v Finland, [2004] 38 EHRR
45, paragraphs 45-46; Case 25405/94, Schapfer v Switzerland, [2001] 33 EHRR 845, paragraphs 29-30.
15 Recital (32) Regulation 462/2013amending Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies.
15
Recital (8) Regulation 462/2013amending Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies.
157 See for example the case of the Spero, Court of Appeal Antwerp, February
14, 1995, Rechtspraak Haven
van Antwerpen 321 (1995) and the case of the Paula, Court of Appeal Antwerp, May 10, 1994, Rechtspraak
Haven van Antwerpen 301 (1995).
15 See for an extensive discussion and further references: De Bruyne, supra note 4, at 196-199; De Bruyne
Vanleenhove, supra note 19, at 120-128.
159 It has been reported in several press releases that the Corte dei Conti wrote that "S&P never in its ratings
pointed out Italy's history, art or landscape which, as universally recognised, are the basis of its economic
strength". See in this regard for example: Stephen Foley & Guy Dinmore, Italy accuses S&P of not getting 'la
dolce vita', Financial Times, February 4, 2014, www.ft.com/content/6ed9649e-8dab-1 I e3-bbe7-00144feab7de;
Francesco Forte, Il Ft sbertuccia leconomia poetica della Corte dei Conti, II Foglio, February 5, 2014,
www.ilfoglio.it/articoli/2014/02/05/news/il-ft-sbertuccia-leconomia-poetica-della-corte-dei-conti-51188/.
Credit ratings of national government (sovereign rating) have to be issued in a manner that ensures that the
individual specificity of a particular Member State has been taken into account (Article 8(a) Regulation
1060/2009 as inserted by Article 1(11) Regulation 462/2013 on credit rating agencies).
153
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toolbox they can use when confronted with the question whether and under which
circumstances ratings, and by extension other certificates,1 60 qualify as protected speech.
Although it remains uncertain which stance courts in Europe will take on this issue, the article
showed there are some openings for CRAs to benefit from the freedom of expression
protection. Protection will more likely be given to ratings that are a matter of general concern
and contribute to the public debate, and when CRAs act as financial journalists. Commercial
speech is also afforded some protection under Article 10 ECHR. Nevertheless, the
government can restrict a credit rating agency's freedom of speech under the conditions set
out in the second paragraph of the Article 10 ECHR.

'60 See for a similar analysis for class certificates issued by classification societies in their private and public
role as Recognized Organization: De Bruyne & Vanleenhove, supra note 12, 304-322.
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